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DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE  
WITH CITIZENS UNITED: 
ARE BANS ON CORPORATE  
DIRECT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS  
STILL CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Jason S. Campbell* 
Since the early twentieth century, the Tillman Act has barred 
corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal office. 
In Citizens United v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a related 
ban that prevented corporations from making independent expenditures 
in candidate elections. The legal foundation of the independent 
expenditure ban was similar to that which still supports the corporate 
direct contributions ban, thus calling into question the continuing 
validity of the direct contributions ban. This Note argues that if the 
Court follows the logical path that it laid down in Citizens United, it 
should overturn the corporate direct contributions ban. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; A.B. Georgetown University. I 
thank Professor Rick Hasen for inspiring this Note, Associate Professor Justin Levitt for his time 
and incomparable guidance, and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
for their hard work and dedication. 
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“Of what avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing 
direct to a candidate and yet permit the expenditure of large 
sums in his behalf?”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his first State of the Union address to Congress, President 
Barack Obama may have broken a bit of protocol. In a direct and 
public tussle with the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court sitting just 
feet away, President Obama said, “With all due deference to 
separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a 
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special 
interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections.”2 The line was as 
powerful as it was controversial: although Citizens United v. FEC3 
does declare unconstitutional a federal ban on corporate independent 
expenditures on behalf of candidates in elections,4 the prohibition 
had only been in place since the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.5 Further, only in 
1976’s landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo6 did the Supreme Court 
first encounter independent expenditures by persons,7 and only in 
1990 did the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce8 
uphold a ban on specifically corporate independent expenditures.9 
What President Obama was likely referring to in his mention to 
a century of law, and what this Note will focus on, is corporate direct 
campaign contributions to candidates in federal elections. A ban on 
such contributions has been in place for more than a century—since 
 
 1. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 581 (1957) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 79-2739, at 40 (1947)). 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-state-union-address). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 917. 
 5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2006)). 
 6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 7. Id. at 7. 
 8. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 9. Id. at 655. 
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1907’s Tillman Act10—and Citizens United does not reach the 
question of the constitutionality of the ban. The reasoning that 
Justice Kennedy used in his majority opinion, however, has raised 
the specter that the bans, long upheld as constitutional, are now at 
least constitutionally suspect.11 Indeed, as this Note argues, if a 
challenge to the ban reaches the Supreme Court as the Court is 
currently composed, it is likely the Court will declare 
unconstitutional bans on corporate direct campaign contributions to 
candidates. 
Such a challenge in the Supreme Court may not be too far off: 
statewide bans in Iowa12 and Minnesota13 and a municipal ban in San 
Diego14 have faced challenges in those jurisdictions,15 and while 
district courts have so far inconsistently extended Citizens United’s 
holding to contribution bans,16 appellate courts have continued to 
uphold the bans because the Court’s decision upholding the ban in 
FEC v. Beaumont is still “good law” unless and until the Court 
overrules it.17 
Part II of this Note will briefly outline the origins of the ban on 
corporate direct campaign contributions. Part III will analyze how 
the Court historically has dealt with each step of the constitutional 
question the federal direct contributions ban implicates, and how 
Citizens United vastly alters the Court’s analytical framework. Part 
IV will look at the corporate direct contribution ban through the 
 
 10. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(2006)). 
 11. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections, 
4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 139 (2009) (stating that Citizens United’s overruling of Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce might foreshadow the unconstitutionality of the contribution 
ban). 
 12. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, No. 4:10-cv-416 RP-TJS, 2011 WL 2649980 
(S.D. Iowa June 29, 2011) (upholding the ban). 
 13. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding the ban). 
 14. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the ban). 
 15. E.g., United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85 (JCC), 2011 WL 2268063, at *6 (E.D. 
Va. June 7, 2011) (declaring the ban unconstitutional). Danielczyk is currently on appeal to the 
Fourth Circuit. 
 16. E.g., Tooker, 2011 WL 2649980, at *10 (finding constitutional the ban on corporate 
direct campaign contributions); Danielczyk, 2011 WL 2268063, at *6 (declaring the ban 
unconstitutional). 
 17. Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 
199 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
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Citizens United frame and argue that the ban is no longer 
constitutional. 
II.  THE ORIGIN OF THE  
BAN ON CORPORATE  
DIRECT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The history of bans on corporate direct campaign contributions 
runs deep in both the state and federal levels of government. This 
Part looks into the origins of the federal ban, which began with the 
Tillman Act in 1907.18 Since similar state bans will remain or fall on 
the same logic as the federal ban, for clarity this Note will focus on 
the federal ban only. 
Congress passed and President Theodore Roosevelt signed the 
Tillman Act at the height of the progressive era in 1907.19 The 
legislation’s precise purpose is the subject of a fair amount of 
disagreement,20 and, as discussed later, the two main positions that 
emerged both found homes in the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence. The first is that the Tillman Act’s primary purpose 
was to protect the political process from the real or perceived 
corruption caused by the undue influence that resulted from 
corporate financial contributions.21 Corporate involvement in 
elections, while a well-known fact in political circles, was considered 
to be illegitimate and so was deliberately hidden.22 The second 
position is that Congress passed the Tillman Act because of its 
concern that “company executives were opportunistically 
 
 18. In 1891 Kentucky passed the first statewide ban on corporate campaign contributions. 
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance 
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 883 (2004). In 1897 Nebraska, Tennessee, Missouri, and Florida also 
passed bans. Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
1, 13 (2008). Since that time states and municipalities have passed their own bans on corporate 
direct contributions. Today, twenty-three states have bans in effect. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES (Jan. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/limits_candidates.pdf. California 
is not among them. 
 19. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(2006)). 
 20. E.g., Winkler, supra note 18, at 880–81 (disagreeing with prevailing scholarly 
interpretation of the purpose of the Tillman Act). 
 21. ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACS AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN LAWS: USE OR ABUSE 
OF POWER? 8 (1986); see EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 12 (1968). 
 22. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1–2 (1988). 
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misappropriating [shareholders’] money”23 without permission—in 
other words, the legislation aimed to prevent company management 
from using the corporate treasury to influence elections without 
shareholder approval.24 Each came to the fore in the corporate and 
political scandals of the early twentieth century.25 
Expenses for and corporate involvement in presidential elections 
grew steadily, beginning with Abraham Lincoln’s 1860 campaign 
and continuing through Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign.26 
Lincoln’s campaign cost his supporters some $100,000 (at least $2 
million today),27 and corporations became a part of campaign 
financing during the Civil War.28 In 1864 Lincoln wrote that 
corporations had become enthroned as a result of the war, “and an 
era of corruption in high places will follow. The money power of the 
country will endeavor to prolong its rule by preying upon the 
prejudices of the people until all wealth is concentrated in a few 
hands and the Republic is destroyed.”29 
If corporations had become a source of campaign funding in the 
1860s, by the mid-1880s they had become the principal source.30 
Some corporations then began making donations of $50,000 or more 
to the national party committees.31 A Republican Party boss 
institutionalized corporate giving in the ensuing decade,32 and by 
1896 William McKinley raised and spent as much as $7 million 
(almost $140 million today) for his presidential campaign.33 Still, an 
organized movement calling for campaign finance reform did not 
 
 23. Winkler, supra note 18, at 873. 
 24. MATASAR, supra note 21, at 8. 
 25. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 18, at 887–900 (discussing how the nation’s three largest 
insurance companies used “other people’s money” to influence the political process in the years 
preceding the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907). 
 26. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 7–12. 
 27. Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1997). 
 28. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 7. 
 29. Id. (quoting JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF 
FUNDRAISING’S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 26 (2000)). 
 30. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance 
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 10 (2005). 
 31. Id.; see also BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM 21 (2001) (listing examples of corporate contributions). 
 32. See Corrado, supra note 30, at 10. 
 33. Smith, supra note 27, at 10. 
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emerge until after Roosevelt’s 1904 election and the Great Wall 
Street Scandal of 1905.34 
The Great Wall Street Scandal was the great corporate scandal 
of its day.35 The New York State Legislature had begun an 
investigation into the alleged self-dealing of insurance company 
executives.36 The stories of company-paid opulent parties and other 
exploits that emerged filled the tabloids, and soon the “whole 
country was in a state of hysteria over [the] insurance matters.”37 The 
investigation then revealed that several major companies had given 
large contributions to the Republican campaign, including $48,000 
(more than $1 million today) from New York Life to Roosevelt’s 
reelection fund.38 In an era in which it was customary to burn records 
of campaign contributions,39 the revelation caused a nationwide, 
front-page sensation “as it furnished the first tangible evidence of 
connections between the insurance company and a political party.”40 
Subsequent inquiry revealed that 72.5 percent of Roosevelt’s 
campaign funding came from corporations.41 
Roosevelt quickly reacted to the New York Life disclosure, and 
his 1905 call for a ban on corporate contributions is regarded as 
creating the forward momentum that was needed for Congress to 
pass the ban on corporate contributions.42 Roosevelt’s 1905 State of 
the Union address set forth the two main rationales behind the 
Tillman Act.43 The President said, 
All contributions by corporations to any political committee 
or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; 
directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ 
money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of 
 
 34. Corrado, supra note 30, at 10; Winkler, supra note 18, at 887. 
 35. Winkler, supra note 18, at 887. 
 36. Id. at 887–88. 
 37. Id. at 888 (quoting MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE 
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 67–68 (1994)). 
 38. Id. at 891–92. The contribution launched more than simply a scandal, but its uncovering 
made a hero out of investigator Charles Evans Hughes, transforming him from a “scarcely 
known” and “mediocre corporate lawyer . . . to Governor of New York in just a year.” Id. at 889–
90. Hughes later became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 39. HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY 356 (1987). 
 40. MUTCH, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1905, at 1). 
 41. PRINGLE, supra note 39, at 357. 
 42. See MUTCH, supra note 22, at 4. 
 43. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 15–16. 
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this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of 
stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.44 
The Tillman Act ban on corporate contributions thus became 
“merely the first concrete manifestation of a continuing 
congressional concern for elections ‘free from the power of 
[corporate] money.’”45 
The insurance company campaign finance scandals and the 
resultant public sentiment in favor of reform propelled the Tillman 
Act forward.46 The scandal distilled two main concerns about 
corporate involvement in elections: corruption and the ultra vires 
appropriation of shareholder wealth. The worry over corruption 
included the concern that congressional representatives had become 
the “instrumentalities and agents of the corporations” from which 
they raised campaign funding.47 Under this view, the underlying 
basis for the Tillman Act’s passage was a move to prevent the 
subversion, or corruption, of the political process in which corporate 
donations were considered illegitimate.48 
The other hypothesis of the Tillman Act’s origins rests in agency 
theory.49 According to Professor Adam Winkler, concern about 
excessive corporate involvement in elections was in fact 
“overshadowed by a different conception of corporate political 
corruption.”50 After the New York Life scandal, the public became 
outraged that insurance company executives had given company 
money without approval to influence political campaigns.51 That 
 
 44. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)). 
 45. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957) (quoting Hearing for 
H. Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong. 12 (1906) (statement of Samuel Gompers, President, Am. 
Fed’n of Labor)). 
 46. Corrado, supra note 30, at 12. Edwin Epstein placed the Tillman Act’s motivational 
origins in the 1890s, when President Benjamin Harrison’s cabinet was known as the 
Businessman’s Cabinet and the U.S. Senate was known as The Millionaire’s Club. EPSTEIN, 
supra note 21, at 1–2. 
 47. Smith, supra note 27, at 24; see MUTCH, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting the Tillman Act’s 
sponsor). Many were also concerned that corporations were bribing voters to support a given 
candidate. See Corrado, supra note 30, at 11 (“[The law] should include severe penalties against 
him who gives or receives a bribe intended to influence his act or opinion as an elector . . . .” 
(quoting Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1904) (transcript available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545#axzz1dRYNtK5h))). 
 48. Winkler, supra note 18, at 893. 
 49. See id. at 873. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 887. 
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money belonged to the company or, more specifically, to the 
policyholders who were considered to be the company owners.52 
Democrats picked up on the theme, and in legislative floor debate 
they emphasized the agency-costs theme repeatedly.53 Under this 
view, Congress passed the Tillman Act to protect the owners of 
companies—shareholders or policyholders—from the use of their 
money against their will for political purposes. Both this shareholder-
protection theory and the corruption-based theory have lived on in 
Court jurisprudence on the issue. 
Both the anticorruption theory and the shareholder-protection 
theory emerged as two of the compelling government interests that 
the Court has recognized when it has considered the constitutionality 
of bans on corporate donations and similar regulations concerning 
corporate involvement in political funding.54 Following the well-
worn framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the 
next Part will consider the Court’s jurisprudence at each analytical 
step. Although the concerns that propelled the Tillman Act into the 
United States Code are more than a century old, they and others 
remain hotly contested. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR THE CORPORATE DIRECT  
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION BAN 
In Citizens United, the Court followed the basic judicial review 
template: define the right, determine whether the right is burdened, 
and weigh the government interest against the burden using the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.55 The Court did, however, 
fundamentally alter the options available at each level of the 
analysis, and this Part will detail those alterations. As will be 
discussed below, the right at issue in campaign contribution cases is 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 923. 
 54. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (“[N]ot only has the original ban 
on direct corporate contributions endured, but so have the original rationales for the law. In 
barring corporate [donations,] . . . the ban was and is intended to ‘preven[t] corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.’” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985))); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (“[The 
ban protects shareholders] from having th[eir] money used to support political candidates to 
whom they may be opposed.”). 
 55. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896–98 (2010). 
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the right of association.56 Citizens United strongly suggests that 
corporations have a right to associate that is analogous to that which 
individuals enjoy. Citizens United further suggests that the Court 
views bans on certain kinds of political funding with increasing 
skepticism, and therefore it will find the right of association 
extremely burdened by the corporate contribution ban. Finally, 
Citizens United significantly narrows the government interests that 
the Court finds important enough to warrant the burden on First 
Amendment rights. If the Court is willing to follow Citizens United’s 
logical extensions, the Court should find the corporate contribution 
ban unconstitutional. 
A.  A Corporate Right to Associate? 
When the issue before the Court involves campaign finance, the 
1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo57 is the prism through which the 
Court looks. The Buckley Court considered the constitutionality of 
the 1974 amendments58 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971.59 The Court considered, among other things, individual limits 
on both campaign contributions to candidates and independent 
expenditures, upholding the former60 and striking down the latter.61 
The distinction, the Court reasoned, was that while independent-
expenditure limits place a “more severe”62 restriction on “political 
expression ‘at the core of . . . First Amendment freedoms,’”63 caps on 
contributions to candidates “entail[] only a marginal restriction upon 
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”64 More 
specifically, the contribution limitation’s primary effect was to 
restrict “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political 
association.”65 This is so because contributing is a symbolic act of 
 
 56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam). 
 57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 58. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263. 
 59. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
 60. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. 
 61. Id. at 143–44. 
 62. Id. at 23. 
 63. Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
 64. Id. at 20–21. 
 65. Id. at 24–25 (emphasis added). 
  
Fall 2011] DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE 181 
associating one’s self with the speech of a candidate.66 Moreover, 
giving a candidate a contribution leaves the contributor otherwise 
free to exercise her freedom of speech by discussing candidates and 
issues.67 This Part will look at the nature of the freedom to associate 
and its relation to the express rights of speech and assembly in the 
First Amendment of the Constitution, and it will conclude that the 
corporations now have a strong claim to freedom of association 
themselves.68 
Although the freedom of association is not expressly mentioned 
in the First Amendment to the Constitution,69 the Court has 
acknowledged that the First Amendment supports such a freedom in 
two distinct senses.70 In one sense, choices to associate in certain 
intimate human relationships like marriages are secured against 
undue government intrusion because of the role that such 
relationships play in safeguarding individual freedom.71 This sense of 
association is protected as a fundamental liberty by the Fourteenth 
Amendment under the doctrine of substantive due process72 and is 
not the focus of this Part. In the other sense, the right to associate as 
an instrument for exercising First Amendment rights like speech is 
protected73 and is therefore derived from those rights. The freedom of 
association exists in this context within the “close nexus” between 
the freedoms of speech and assembly.74 There the freedom to 
associate functions to preserve the exercise of those rights,75 but it is 
 
 66. Id. at 21. 
 67. Id. 
 68. To be clear, in considering whether a corporation has a right to associate that is 
analogous to the individual right, the right for individuals to associate as a corporation is not at 
issue. Rather, the issue is whether a corporation itself has a right to associate itself with a 
candidate for political office. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 70. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). 
 71. Id. at 617–18. 
 72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) (holding that marriage is 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment because “[i]t is an association that promotes a way of 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.”). 
 73. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. 
 74. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 75. SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 22 (1992). 
  
182 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:171 
no less fundamental simply for being derived from them.76 This sense 
of the freedom is the focus of this Part. 
For individuals, it is easy to see how the freedom of association 
is a necessary derivative of the other rights in the First Amendment. 
It is simply the avenue by which individuals exercise collectively 
their individually held First Amendment rights.77 Collective exercise 
is protected because if the government “forbid[s] two or more people 
from banding together to express a point of view, [it] may have 
effectively forbidden them singly to express that point of view.”78 In 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley79 Chief Justice 
Burger briefly described why it is so essential to protect political 
association: 
[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding 
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in 
the American political process. The 18th-century 
Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were 
early examples of this phenomena and the Federalist Papers 
were perhaps the most significant and lasting example. The 
tradition of volunteer committees for collective action has 
manifested itself in myriad community and public 
activities; in the political process it can focus on a candidate 
or on a ballot measure. Its value is that by collective effort 
individuals can make their views known, when, 
individually, their voices would be faint or lost.80 
Notwithstanding this importance, because the freedom to 
associate is derived from other First Amendment rights, its contours 
cannot be broader than those of its source rights.81 It is necessary, 
then, to determine the scope of a corporation’s right to freedom of 
speech, and only then to consider whether a corporation has the 
derivative right to associate. 
 
 76. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
 77. LEADER, supra note 75, at 22. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
 80. Id. at 294. 
 81. LEADER, supra note 75, at 23. 
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1.  The Source of the Corporate  
Freedom of Association 
The corporate right to the freedom of speech is defined by two 
animating concepts. First, in general the freedom of speech is 
protected because of the interests of two parties: the speaker and the 
listener.82 The second concept is more of an open question as to 
whether, when a corporation is speaking,83 the expression is that of 
the corporation as an entity apart from its shareholders, or whether 
the expression represents the collective voice of those shareholders. 
The distinction between speaker and listener interests is 
particularly important in the context of corporate speech. For the 
individual speaker, the freedom of speech protects fundamental 
aspects of personhood,84 including self-expression and self-
realization.85 For individual speakers, “[t]he First Amendment serves 
not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a 
spirit that demands self-expression.”86 
The Court has recognized something of a need for expression in 
corporations, but the need is far more circumscribed than the 
personal self-expression need.87 Under the commercial speech 
doctrine, commercial speech is that which is “closely related to 
effecting commercial transactions . . . and/or speech whose 
occurrence and content are motivated largely by the speaker’s 
economic interests.”88 The early rationale for protecting corporate 
speech in the form of retail advertising was to enable consumers to 
make better commercial decisions,89 and thus it was consumers’ need 
 
 82. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected 
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1233 
(1991). 
 83. A corporation cannot, of course, speak. This Note will nonetheless engage in the fiction 
that messages transmitted on behalf of a corporation represent the corporation speaking. 
 84. Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1232–33. 
 85. Id. at 1233; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative 
free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression . . . .”). 
 86. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 87. See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 386 (2006) (recognizing that the First Amendment 
protects commercial expression, though less so than it protects noncommercial expression). 
 88. Id. at 388–89. 
 89. See id. at 389 (“The principal rationale given for protecting commercial speech is the 
interests of consumers and of society in general in ‘the free flow of commercial information.’” 
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for information that was burdened by restrictions on corporate 
speech. Later cases, however, emphasized the burden that regulation 
placed on corporate retailers themselves, and the cases paid only lip 
service to any burden on the consumer.90 In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly,91 the Court spoke specifically of the burden on a tobacco 
retailer in terms of the corporate retailer’s need to convey 
information about its product.92 Insofar as commercial speech is 
concerned, if corporations have an interest or need in expression, it is 
only to the extent that the expression is tied to the corporation’s 
economic interests. In other words, corporations can advertise their 
business in the hopes of transacting business.93 
Apart from the commercial speech doctrine, the freedom of 
speech protects the listener’s right to hear political speech, but the 
speech itself is protected for the listener’s sake—not, in this case, for 
the corporate speaker’s sake.94 Meir Dan-Cohen created a useful 
example to illustrate the point: 
A right may be recognized in A out of [a self-expression 
and self-realization] concern for A himself. In such a case, 
A has . . . an original right. A right in A may also result 
from a concern not for him but for B[’s need to hear the 
speech]. In this case, A will be said to have a derivative 
right.95 
This derivative right is also passive, since in this context A’s interest 
is not in speaking, which is an active right, but in A’s not being 
interrupted so that B has the opportunity to hear him.96 We are left 
with two classes of rights that the freedom of speech protects: the 
active original right and the passive derivative right.97 
 
(citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 
(1976))). 
 90. Id. at 391. 
 91. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 92. Id. at 564. 
 93. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (“A quarter of a 
century ago, the Court held that commercial speech, usually defined as speech that does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction, is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 94. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1245. 
 95. Id. at 1233. 
 96. Id. at 1234. 
 97. Id. at 1234, 1244. 
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Because corporations do not share the natural person’s need for 
self-expression98 beyond their economic interest, or, as former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist more broadly termed it, the need for freedom of 
conscience,99 it follows that, before Citizens United, corporations as 
entities apart from their shareholders did not have an original right to 
freedom of speech in the political context. Political speech, though 
difficult to define precisely, is surely self-expressive.100 However, 
corporate speech in the political context is important because it 
increases the “stock of information from which . . . the public may 
draw.”101 As described more fully below, corporate political speech 
before Citizens United therefore fit within the First Amendment’s 
protection because the Court viewed it as a passive derivative right—
derivative because it was based on the public’s right to listen, and 
passive because it was based on the public’s right to hear, not the 
corporation’s right to speak.102 
2.  Corporate Speech and Association  
Rights Before Citizens United 
The Supreme Court adopted for corporate political speech the 
passive derivative model described above103 in 1978’s First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.104 First National Bank challenged the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts state law that prohibited business 
corporations from making contributions or expenditures to influence 
the outcome of a ballot measure.105 In characterizing the right at 
 
 98. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the First 
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-
fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech.”). 
 99. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
 100. See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 17, 23 (2008) (“Professor Baker said: ‘[t]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage 
in self-definition [and] expression. A Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she chants 
“Stop This War Now” at a demonstration, she does so without any expectation that her speech 
will affect continuance of the war . . .; rather, she participates and chants in order to define herself 
publicly in opposition to the war.’” (quoting C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978))). 
 101. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. 
 102. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1245. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 105. Id. at 768 n.2. 
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issue, the Court dismissed the subject of corporate First Amendment 
rights106 by stating that the questions were not whether corporations 
have First Amendment rights and whether those rights are 
coextensive with individuals’ rights.107 The Court asked instead 
whether Massachusetts’s law abridged expression that the First 
Amendment protected,108 thus focusing on the speech itself rather 
than on the speaker.109 The Court held that the law did so abridge 
protected expression not because the corporation had a right to 
freedom of speech that was analogous to the personal right, but 
because of the First Amendment interest in “affording the public 
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information 
and ideas.”110 Thus, Bellotti rested not on the basis of any rights or 
interests of the corporation itself111 but on “protecting the 
constitutional rights of people”112 to receive the information the 
speech conveys. The Court was very careful never to say that it was 
protecting a corporation’s active right to speak. 
The Court gave perhaps its clearest endorsement of the view that 
the corporate speech right is less fundamental in 1990’s Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.113 There the Court upheld as 
constitutional a ban on corporate independent expenditures on behalf 
of candidates in federal election campaigns.114 In contrast, the 
Buckley Court held that such expenditures by individuals could not 
be limited because they were a “severe restriction[]” on protected 
freedoms.115 
Returning to the premise that the right to associate is itself 
derivative of the freedom of speech, it becomes difficult to discern 
whether in the pre-Citizens United era corporations had the right to 
 
 106. Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political Contributions 
Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 310 (2006). 
 107. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776; see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights 
of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 870 (2007) (“Bellotti . . . is of potentially 
limited significance when it comes to corporate political speech rights.”). 
 108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. 
 109. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 187 (2003). 
 110. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. 
 111. Bennigson, supra note 87, at 399. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 655. 
 115. Buckley v. Valeo, 435 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
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associate politically. Before Citizens United, business corporations 
had a direct right to speak, as the commercial speech doctrine 
recognized;116 political speech, however, was protected only insofar 
as it was necessary to protect the right of people to hear the corporate 
message.117 While it may be said that collective association enhances 
listeners’ rights, the Court never held that corporations had the right 
of political association. It is therefore unclear whether a corporate 
right to associate existed in an era when the Court conceived of 
corporate rights as derivative.118 
3.  Corporate Speech and Association  
Rights After Citizens United 
The Citizens United decision fundamentally recasts the nature of 
a corporate right to speak,119 taking it much closer to the original 
right discussed above. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion jettisoned 
the carefully circumscribed language of Bellotti in favor of language 
that significantly broadened both the question presented and the 
answer that followed. As a result, the post-Citizens United argument 
for a corporate right to associate in the form of direct campaign 
contributions to candidates became much stronger, if not 
unassailable. 
In the first sentence of the section in which it explicated the 
corporate speech right, the Citizens United majority cited no fewer 
than twenty-one Supreme Court decisions spanning fifty years of 
jurisprudence for the proposition that “[t]he Court has recognized 
that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.”120 The 
 
 116. See Bennigson, supra note 87. 
 117. Id. at 423–24. 
 118. Nevertheless, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of 
California, the Court recognized at least a corporate right not to be forced to associate. 475 U.S. 
1, 12–17 (1986). The Commission required Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) to allow a 
utility ratepayer’s advocacy group to enclose insertions in PG&E’s billing envelopes. Id. at 4. 
Chief Justice Burger likened this to forcing PG&E to print the messages of others on its utility 
trucks and other property. Id. at 21 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Powell, writing for the 
majority as he had in Bellotti, wrote that such forced associations were impermissible, even for 
corporations. Id. at 15. A right not to be forced to do something, however, does not create or 
imply a right to do the thing. Pacific Gas therefore does not show that corporations, before 
Citizens United, had the right to associate with candidates via contributions. 
 119. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 958 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The only thing about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined 
to adopt the majority’s position.”). 
 120. Id. at 899 (majority opinion). 
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seeming consistency of fifty years, however, was later undermined 
when the Court acknowledged that “[o]ur Nation’s speech dynamic 
is changing . . . .”121 Its discussion of Bellotti plainly shows the 
change. 
The Court put broad and inexact language to work in the service 
of making it seem as though its decision merely returned to and 
reapplied the sound principles that it had announced in Bellotti.122 
The Court first made it clear that in no context could the government 
distinguish the First Amendment rights of corporations from those of 
individuals.123 It then referenced Bellotti, unqualifiedly stating that 
the “central principle” of Bellotti was “that the First Amendment 
does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s 
corporate identity.”124 Bellotti, however, expressly circumscribed its 
own holding by indicating that the speech protection that it found 
was contextually limited.125 Nowhere in the Citizens United opinion 
did the majority offer a similar limiting principle on its holding. The 
closest that the Court came to recognizing such a principle was in 
passively noting that corporate contribution limits have been an 
accepted means of preventing quid pro quo corruption, and that the 
petitioners had not suggested that the Court reconsider this 
position.126 Thus, while the Court took great pains to make clear 
Citizens United’s logical commonalities with Bellotti, its holding in 
Citizens United was far broader. 
The Court further departed from Bellotti by repeatedly equating 
the corporate speaker to the individual human speaker.127 It held that, 
as opposed to merely recognizing protection of a corporation’s right 
to speak because of listeners’ rights, “[t]he Court has . . . rejected the 
argument that political speech of corporations . . . should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
 
 121. Id. at 912. 
 122. See id. at 913 (“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti . . . .”). 
 123. See id. at 900. 
 124. Id. at 903. 
 125. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (“[O]ur 
consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no 
comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election 
to public office.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing the “explicit limitation” on the scope of the Bellotti holding). 
 126. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. 
 127. See id. at 884, 900, 912, 929. 
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associations are not ‘natural persons.’”128 Adding to this clear 
equivalence of corporate speech rights and individual speech rights, 
the Court noted that corporations “have the need or the motive to 
communicate their views.”129 Although the Court recognized the role 
of listener rights, it recognized that corporations have the need for 
self-expression and self-realization—one of the primary rationales 
that underlies the personal freedom of speech—and thus that 
corporations have an original speech right.130 This explains how the 
Court held that, in the context of political speech, the First 
Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical 
distinctions based on whether the speaker is a corporation or an 
individual.131  
Another way to say that the First Amendment allows for no 
categorical distinctions between corporations and individuals is to 
say that corporations and individuals enjoy a right that is 
coextensive. Individuals, as discussed above, have an original right 
to speech, meaning that they have a right to self-expression for their 
own sake completely apart from any concern for the listener or for 
increasing the information that is available to the public. Bellotti and 
later holdings acknowledged a distinction between corporations and 
individuals on the basis that corporate speech rights were derivative, 
not original, and the Court thus carefully limited those decisions in 
the context of political speech from categorically equating a 
corporation with a person. Because it recognizes corporate original 
speech rights, the Citizens United opinion finds any distinction 
repugnant in the context of political expression. 
This has direct implications for the corporate contributions ban 
because the recognition of corporate original speech rights bolsters a 
corporate claim to the freedom of association. If political speech 
rights for corporations are tied to the corporation as an entity, as 
Citizens United strongly implies they are, then corporate political 
expression would “undeniably [be] enhanced by group 
association.”132 Citizens United is therefore where the corporate 
 
 128. Id. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776). 
 129. Id. at 906. 
 130. See id. at 906–08. 
 131. Id. at 913. 
 132. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (quoting 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
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rubber meets the freedom-of-association road. This has direct 
implications for the corporate direct contribution ban because, with 
the full protection of a corporate original speech right in hand, 
corporations now may invoke their right of political association in 
order to make direct contributions to political candidates. 
B.  Alternative Means for Expression  
and the Burden That Bans Place on  
Corporate Association Rights 
Finding that corporations have a right to political association 
does not require a finding that any regulation that implicates the right 
is unconstitutional.133 Instead, the given regulation must also burden 
the right.134 The Court has gone so far as to say that even a significant 
burden that contribution regulations place on association rights may 
be sustained.135 
Beginning with Buckley in 1976, the Court set out a relatively 
unworried view of the burden that contribution limits place on 
associational rights. The Buckley Court considered individual 
campaign contribution limits that Congress had enacted in the early 
1970s.136 The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) limited 
individual contributions to $1,000 per candidate.137 The Court set out 
its analysis by noting that the primary problem that contribution 
limits raise is their restriction on one aspect of a contributor’s 
association right, as described above.138 The Court then noted that 
even if the contributions limit affected this “narrow aspect” of 
political association, individuals remained free to engage in 
independent political expression, to volunteer their services to 
political campaigns, and to assist campaigns with the limited 
donation that FECA permitted.139 The limitations therefore failed to 
 
 133. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“[N]either the right to associate 
nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute . . . .” (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973))). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 6. 
 137. Id. at 7. 
 138. Id. at 24–25. 
 139. See id. at 28–29. 
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undermine “to any material degree” the individual’s rights at issue, 
and the Court upheld the limits.140 
Since a corporation cannot physically volunteer for a candidate, 
Congress created the political action committee (PAC) option as an 
alternative means for corporate expression.141 A PAC is a separate, 
segregated fund that a corporation forms to raise and spend money to 
get candidates elected.142 Each PAC is distinct from its corporate 
parent, and shareholders may donate funds to support the PAC’s 
political activities.143 Each PAC must be registered with the Federal 
Elections Commission (FEC), appoint a treasurer, keep for three 
years records of receipts and disbursements, and file financial reports 
disclosing its contributors and their contributions.144 The FEC 
regulates in some form almost all aspects of PAC activity.145 
In 2003 the Court addressed the current federal ban on corporate 
contributions in one of four cases that one scholar deemed the “New 
Deference Quartet.”146 FEC v. Beaumont147 and the other Quartet 
members marked the Court’s very deferential approach to legislative 
determinations on the need for campaign finance regulation.148 The 
Court in Beaumont confronted a split among the circuit courts of 
appeals as to the constitutionality of the Tillman Act149 as applied to 
to nonprofit advocacy corporations.150 A political advocacy 
corporation funded by individual member contributions mounted an 
 
 140. Id. at 29. 
 141. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1982). 
 142. THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST 
GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY 5 (1996). 
 143. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887–88 (2010) (discussing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b(b)(2) (2006)); see also Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 204–06 (upholding the 
requirement that funds come only from shareholders and union members). 
 144. See generally FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR CORPORATIONS AND 
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf (explaining 
the rules each PAC must follow). 
 145. See generally id. (describing the various regulations PACs must follow). 
 146. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign 
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 67–
68 (2004). 
 147. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
 148. See generally Hasen, supra note 146 (discussing how two cases within the Quartet, 
McConnell and Beaumont, were overturned or significantly undermined by Citizens United). 
 149. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 150. 
 150. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006) (“It is unlawful for any . . . corporation whatever, or any 
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election . . . .”). 
  
192 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:171 
as-applied challenge to the ban.151 Justice Souter, writing for the six-
member majority,152 hardly addressed and all but dismissed whether a 
contribution ban burdened the freedom of association.153 The Court 
considered contribution restrictions, a phrase that it broadly defined 
to include the ban, as “closer to the edges than to the core of political 
expression.”154 Further, the Court saw a corporation’s option of 
channeling contributions through a PAC as ameliorating any concern 
about the burden on associational rights.155 As such, any burden on or 
interference with the plaintiff corporation’s associational right, if 
any, was cause for little concern.156 
Beaumont viewed the ban on corporate direct campaign 
contributions in two contexts—the broader regulatory scheme on the 
one hand,157 and the relationship between a corporation and its PAC 
on the other.158 As to the broader regulatory scheme, Justice Souter 
situated the contributions ban within the “careful legislative 
adjustment of the federal electoral laws.”159 More important, 
however, the Court emphasized that the associative burden was on 
the shareholders, not on the corporation itself.160 Although the 
corporate plaintiff argued that the regulation in question was a 
complete ban on the corporation’s ability to donate to candidates,161 
the Court disagreed and held that the PAC option did not 
“jeopardiz[e] the associational rights of [shareholders].”162 The focus 
on the shareholders, rather than on the corporation itself, reflected 
Justice Souter’s view that corporate speech rights are derivative—not 
only in the sense described above with respect to listener rights, but 
also in the sense that a speaking corporation is really the sum of its 
 
 151. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151. 
 152. Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment. 
 153. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161–62. 
 154. Id. at 161. 
 155. See id. at 162–63. 
 156. Id. at 162. 
 157. See id. at 152–56. 
 158. See id. at 156–59. 
 159. Id. at 153 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)). 
 160. Id. at 162–63. 
 161. Id. at 162. 
 162. Id. at 163. 
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shareholders.163 The prohibition on corporate contributions therefore 
amounted to a ban in name only, since the PAC option still allowed 
shareholder participation in federal elections. 
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life164 (WRTL II), however, the 
Court shifted on the issue of the rights in question and on its view of 
whether the PAC option alleviated the burden on that right.165 Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote in WRTL II’s plurality opinion that Justice 
Souter’s “dissent overstates its case when it asserts that the ‘PAC 
alternative’ gives corporations a constitutionally sufficient outlet to 
speak.”166 Instead, “PACs impose well-documented and onerous 
burdens, particularly on small nonprofits.”167 Thus, in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s view, the burden was on the corporation itself, not on the 
shareholders. 
Later, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy cemented this shift. 
Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in part in McConnell v. FEC168 
and there likened PACs to “compulsory ventriloquism,”169 now wrote 
for an outright majority of the Court. The Court described PACs as 
burdensome alternatives that failed to alleviate the burden that an 
independent expenditure ban placed on the First Amendment.170 
Thus, the Citizens United Court focused on the corporation itself, 
holding that the PAC option “does not allow corporations to 
speak.”171 This shift on whose right is being burdened tracks the 
broader move from viewing corporate speech rights as derivative to 
viewing corporate speech rights as original. Where a corporate right 
is derived from those of shareholders and listeners, as in Beaumont 
and Bellotti, the focus necessarily is on them; on the other hand, 
when the corporation itself has the original right, as in Citizens 
United, the focus necessarily is on the corporation. 
 
 163. See id. (“The PAC option allows corporate political participation without . . . 
jeopardizing the association[] rights of advocacy organizations’ members.”). 
 164. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 165. Id. at 532. 
 166. Id. at 536 n.9. Although only Justice Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, their 
position between the opinions of Justice Souter and Justice Scalia made decisive the Chief 
Justice’s opinion. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory 
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1079 (2008). 
 167. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 536 n.9. 
 168. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 169. Id. at 333 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010). 
 171. Id. 
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The shift of focus to the rights of the corporation will change the 
calculus if and when the Court again confronts the corporate direct 
contribution ban. While in Beaumont and the other New Deference 
Quartet cases a PAC option satisfied the Court that shareholders’ 
associative rights were adequately protected, now it is likely that the 
PAC option is inadequate because the law forcing corporations to 
channel donations through PACs prevents the corporation itself from 
donating to candidates. It is simply not enough that shareholders can 
donate, and thus express themselves, via the PAC. The burden placed 
on the right is not alleviated. 
C.  Citizens United Discards Many of the 
 Government Interests That Have Supported 
 and Could Continue to Support the Ban 
Thus far this Note shown how the logic of Citizens United 
militates for finding a corporate right to associate and a significant 
burden on that right. But the inquiry does not end there. The Court 
also overtly and drastically limited the range of government interests 
against which to balance the burden. This Part will outline the 
government interests that the Court previously recognized, and it will 
show that Citizens United significantly narrows or discards all but 
one. Before Citizens United, the Court had recognized three interests 
on which the government could support contribution and expenditure 
limits. 
1.  The Anticorruption Rationale 
The anticorruption rationale is a derivative of the popular 
sentiment against corporate involvement in elections that the 
insurance scandals of the early twentieth century sparked.172 The 
Court’s seminal decision in Buckley, of course, laid the foundation 
on which the anticorruption interest would expand and, ultimately, 
contract.173 In discussing contribution limits applicable to individuals, 
the Buckley Court explained: 
 
 172. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 12 (“[The] primary purpose [of the Tillman Act of 1907] 
was to destroy the influence over elections that corporations exercised through their financial 
contributions.”). 
 173. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–30 (1976) (per curiam); Zephyr Teachout, The 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 384 (2009) (“[Buckley] sets up the modern 
framework for analyzing corruption . . . .”). 
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 To the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such 
pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, . . . 
the problem is not an illusory one. 
 Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid 
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of 
corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions.174 
At least as far as Buckley is concerned, the baseline of corruption 
seems to be limited to the actual or perceived existence of a quid pro 
quo—“dollars for political favors.”175 But, as one scholar has argued, 
the vagueness of the definition of corruption “left an important 
word/concept as a big lacuna to be filled by the political philosophy 
of each of the Justices.”176 
Cases after Buckley bear this out. Only nine years later, for 
instance, the Court described a more conceptual, less definite 
baseline for corruption.177 In FEC v. National Conservative Political 
Action Committee178 the Court explained that corruption is “a 
subversion of the political process” to the extent that “[e]lected 
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office 
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money 
into their campaigns.”179 The McConnell Court adopted this addition 
and held that corruption encompasses not only Buckley’s appearance 
of a quid pro quo but also the “more subtle but equally dispiriting” 
appearance of undue influence.180 The McConnell Court wrote that 
undue influence—the danger that office holders would decide issues 
not on their merits or on the preferences of their constituents but 
 
 174. 424 U.S. at 26–27. 
 175. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985). 
 176. See Teachout, supra note 173, at 385. 
 177. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. 
 178. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 179. Id. at 497. 
 180. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143–44, 153 (2003) (stating that the Government’s 
interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption would be impeded if the Court 
took away Congress’s authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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instead in favor of their large donors—was as troubling as the danger 
of exchanging money for favorable votes.181 Justice Kennedy 
vigorously dissented on this point, saying that favoritism and 
influence are unavoidable in representative politics, and that one 
reason for a donor to make a contribution to a candidate is that the 
candidate will respond by producing the outcomes that the donor 
favors.182 “Democracy,” Justice Kennedy said, “is premised on [such] 
responsiveness.”183 
There is one wrinkle to the anticorruption rationale that the 
Justices have agreed on: it includes an interest in avoiding 
circumvention of laws that limit individual contributions.184 The 
Beaumont Court recognized that “restricting contributions by various 
organizations hedges against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention 
of [valid] contribution limits.’”185 That is, if an individual is limited 
in how much she may lawfully donate to a candidate, she could 
exceed those limitations simply by forming multiple corporations 
and diverting her money through them.186 At one point, all members 
of the Court agreed that the anticircumvention interest is a form of 
the anticorruption interest.187 Because Citizens United concerned 
independent expenditures that individuals are not limited in making, 
the Court did not address the anticircumvention interest. Beaumont 
was the last time that the Court addressed the issue. 
The Citizens United Court did discuss the anticorruption interest 
generally.188 The Court circumscribed the anticorruption rationale, 
largely retreading Justice Kennedy’s dissent in McConnell.189 The 
Court dismissed the notion that favoritism and influence are 
corruptive and held that reliance on them is at odds with standard 
First Amendment analyses because they are susceptible to no 
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limiting principle.190 Moreover, the Court wrote that the appearance 
of influence or access would not cause voters to lose faith in 
American democracy.191 Instead, in spending money on advertising 
in an attempt to persuade voters, makers of independent expenditures 
presumed that the voters were the ultimate source of influence over 
their representatives.192 
Thus, Citizens United strictly limits the anticorruption rationale 
to reach only the threat of actual quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance of it. Also left standing within this definition is 
Beaumont’s anticircumvention interest. Together, they remain the 
only government interests that a court may use to sustain the 
corporate contributions ban. 
2.  The Shareholder-Protection Rationale 
After considering the anticorruption principle, Beaumont 
considered other rationales for upholding the ban, including 
shareholder protection.193 As we have seen, shareholder protection is 
part of the agency theory on which the Tillman Act prohibition was 
originally based.194 In Beaumont, Justice Souter quoted FEC v. 
National Right to Work Committee195 (NRWC) for the proposition that 
the corporate contribution ban protects “the individuals who have 
paid money into a corporation for purposes other than the support of 
candidates”—in other words, the shareholders—“from having that 
money used to support political candidates to whom they may be 
opposed.”196 The NRWC Court agreed with the government’s 
argument that protecting the interests of dissenting shareholders was 
“sufficient to justify” the regulation.197 
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The shareholder-protection principle received its most robust 
defense in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Austin.198 Austin, 
which Citizens United overrules, considered Michigan’s ban on 
corporate independent expenditures.199 The Court upheld the ban,200 
with Justice Brennan joining the Court’s opinion in addition to 
writing separately.201 The expenditure ban, he explained, “protects 
dissenting shareholders of business corporations . . . to the extent that 
such shareholders oppose the use of their money, paid as dues . . . out 
of general corporate treasury funds, for political campaigns.”202 
In his dissent in Austin, Justice Kennedy protested that “[t]o the 
extent that members disagree with a nonprofit corporation’s policies, 
they can seek change from within, withhold financial support, cease 
to associate with the group, or form a rival group of their own.”203 
Justice Brennan rejected this notion, writing that such measures 
would impose a financial sacrifice on objectors.204 But while the state 
may have no constitutional duty to protect the objecting shareholder, 
the state has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation from 
exploiting those shareholders who do not wish to contribute to the 
corporation’s supposed political message.205 Although for the 
purposes of Austin Justice Kennedy lost the argument as to the 
validity of shareholder protection as a valid governmental interest, 
his point of view would “in time . . . command the support of a 
majority of th[e] Court.”206 
As it did with the anticorruption interest, the Citizens United 
majority adopted Justice Kennedy’s view.207 In overruling Austin,208 
the Court held in just two paragraphs that there was little evidence 
that shareholders are unable to use the shareholder voting process to 
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correct perceived abuses or are unable to simply sell their shares of 
stock in corporations that support candidates with whom the 
shareholders disagree.209 Because of the ease of opting out in some 
way, it seems that Citizens United vanquishes the shareholder-
protection interest in all contexts, not merely in the narrow 
independent expenditure situation that the Court addressed there. 
3.  The Antidistortion Interest 
The final traditional basis for upholding the corporate direct 
contribution ban is the antidistortion rationale. Like the shareholder-
protection interest, antidistortion is ultimately a concern about undue 
influence.210 Unlike the anticorruption and shareholder-protection 
rationales that had their origins in the scandal surrounding the 1904 
election, antidistortion became a concern in the 1940s.211 In 1943 
Congress passed the Smith-Connolly Act, thereby bringing labor 
unions under the Tillman Act’s prohibition for the remainder of 
World War II.212 In 1947, Congress made the union prohibition 
permanent when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act213 “to protect the 
political process from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of 
money employed in elections by aggregated power.”214 However, in 
Austin—a case that bore directly on corporate, not union, campaign 
activity—the Court expressly applied the antidistortion rationale to 
corporations.215 
The Austin Court wrote of “the corrosive and distorting effects 
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”216 Corporate 
wealth, in the Court’s view, had the potential to unfairly influence 
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elections when that wealth is deployed in the form of independent 
expenditures.217 By limiting direct corporate expenditures and 
requiring them to be financed through PACs funded by donations 
from the corporation, its employees, and others, the Court sought to 
ensure that expenditures would reflect actual public support for the 
political ideas that PACs—and by extension their corporate 
parents—espoused.218 The Court stressed, however, that a 
corporation’s ability to accumulate large amounts of wealth was, 
itself, not what justified the expenditure ban; instead, the state-
conferred corporate structure that facilitated the amassing of large 
treasuries warranted the limit on independent expenditures.219 
As he did with respect to the shareholder-protection rationale, 
Justice Kennedy vigorously disagreed with the antidistortion interest 
that the majority recognized.220 He argued that 
[T]here is no reason to assume that the corporate form has 
an intrinsic flaw that makes it corrupt, or that all 
corporations possess great wealth, or that all corporations 
can buy more media coverage for their views than can 
individuals or other groups. There is no reason to conclude 
that independent speech by a corporation is any more likely 
to dominate the political arena than speech by the wealthy 
individual, . . . or by the well-funded PAC . . . .221 
Once again, although he lost the battle in Austin, Justice Kennedy 
would later prevail on the question of the validity of the 
antidistortion interest.222 
Before Justice Kennedy would have that opportunity, however, 
the Court decided Beaumont. Austin, as noted above, concerned a 
ban on corporate independent expenditures, not on corporate direct 
campaign contributions. In Beaumont, however, the Court 
recognized the antidistortion rationale in the context of the ban on 
corporate direct contributions.223 The Court held that a nonprofit 
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advocacy corporation benefitted from state-created advantages just 
as its for-profit counterparts did and that the nonprofit potentially 
could amass just as substantial political “war chests.”224 Justice 
Kennedy, noting his dissent in Austin, concurred in Beaumont’s 
judgment only.225 
As it did with the shareholder-protection interest, Citizens 
United essentially nullifies the antidistortion interest that the Court 
had recognized for at least twenty years.226 The Court held that 
antidistortion is a rationale that seeks to equalize the speech of 
different speakers—a holding that is inconsistent with Buckley and 
other cases.227 In what is perhaps Buckley’s most famous single 
sentence, seven members of the Court agreed that “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society 
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to 
the First Amendment . . . .”228 In contrast, Austin defended the 
antidistortion rationale as a means of preventing corporations from 
using vast wealth to obtain an unfair advantage in the market for 
political ideas.229 The Citizens United majority emphatically rejected 
this, writing that “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited 
based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the 
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the 
suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”230 In 
the Court’s view, the antidistortion rationale is a form of viewpoint 
discrimination and is thus invalid in any analysis of First 
Amendment freedoms.231 
In sum, Citizens United vastly undermines the interests that the 
Court had traditionally used as the basis for upholding the 
independent expenditure ban along with the ban on corporate direct 
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contributions. The Court severely circumscribed the anticorruption 
interest and rejected the shareholder-protection and antidistortion 
interests with such force that their future use is doubtful. With those 
interests on the ash heap of jurisprudential history, only the narrowed 
anticorruption interest and the anticircumvention interest remained as 
bases for upholding campaign finance regulations—the corporate 
direct contribution ban among them. 
IV.  THE CITIZENS UNITED FRAMEWORK  
MILITATES AGAINST THE  
CORPORATE DIRECT CONTRIBUTION BAN 
Citizens United creates a new framework in which to analyze 
corporate First Amendment rights. First, the case limits the rationales 
that are available to the government in arguing that the Court should 
uphold the corporate campaign contribution limitation, making it 
probable that the Justices will be more skeptical of the ban when a 
party contests its constitutionality before the Court. Second, the 
Court recognized that a corporation has an original speech right, 
making it clear that corporations have the full benefits of the 
derivative-association right. Third, Citizens United marks a shift in 
perspective on whose right is being burdened by regulations on 
corporate involvement in campaign funding—making it more likely 
that the Court will find the contribution ban to be a significant 
burden on corporations themselves, rather than on corporate 
shareholders or on hearers of the corporate message. To stay 
logically consistent with this new framework, the Court should 
overrule the weakened Beaumont precedent that upholds the 
corporate contributions ban. The following analysis explains why. 
A.  The Level of Scrutiny 
Because the Citizens United Court did not confront the question 
of direct contributions, it did not have the opportunity to alter the 
level of scrutiny to which it would subject the corporate ban. In 
Buckley, the Court applied the “closely drawn” level of scrutiny.232 
At this level, a regulation that involves a significant burden on 
association rights will be upheld “if the State demonstrates a 
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sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”233 
Closely drawn scrutiny is thus less probing than strict scrutiny is, but 
it is greater than simple rational basis review is. Although some 
members of the Court have argued that strict scrutiny ought to apply 
in all cases that involve political speech, including those involving 
contribution limits,234 the oracular nature of Buckley’s position in 
campaign-finance cases means that the Court is unlikely to change 
course. The totality of the ban, however, means that the closely 
drawn standard will be sufficient for the Court to use to strike down 
the ban. 
B.  The Corporate Contributions Ban Severely  
Burdens Corporate Associational Rights 
The burden that the ban places on corporations’ associational 
rights is severe. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,235 a case 
concerning a state law that banned individuals registered as lobbyists 
from making donations to political candidates,236 the Second Circuit 
explained that where a law imposes contribution bans on discrete 
groups, the ban “utterly eliminates [that group’s] right to express 
[its] support for a candidate by contributing money to the candidate’s 
cause.”237 Quoting Buckley, the court wrote that a contribution ban 
“cuts off even ‘the symbolic expression of support evidenced by’ a 
small contribution”238 that a contributions limit would allow. 
Moreover, none of this is alleviated by the corporation’s ability to 
divert its donations though a PAC, since Citizens United shows that 
the corporation’s rights are not the same as—and thus are not 
affected by—the PAC’s rights. To that end, a general ban on 
corporate direct campaign contributions, like the ban in Green Party, 
not only significantly burdens the corporate right to associate but 
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extinguishes its exercise entirely. The ban allows for not even the 
slightest symbolic donation. 
C.  The Remaining Interests Are Important, but  
the Law Is Inadequately Tailored 
Against this significant burden the Court has only the 
circumscribed anticorruption interest, along with its included 
anticircumvention interest, to weigh. Moreover, the Green Party 
court quoted Buckley to hold that if the state’s interest could be 
achieved by the means of a limit—as opposed to a ban—“the ban 
should be struck down for failing ‘to avoid unnecessary abridgement 
of associational freedoms.’”239 In other words, the ban should be 
struck down because it is poorly tailored. 
As to anticorruption, the ban is poorly tailored, indeed, since a 
law could satisfy anticorruption concerns simply by subjecting 
corporations to the individual limit rather than by banning corporate 
donations altogether. As described above, Citizens United dismisses 
any distinction between individual and corporate speech rights in the 
political context. Laws must therefore avoid unnecessarily burdening 
a corporation’s associational freedoms in the same way that they 
must avoid burdening the associational freedoms of individuals. An 
outright ban on corporate donations leaves corporations unable to 
exercise their associational freedoms in even a symbolic way, let 
alone in the limited way in which an individual may exercise her 
coextensive rights. Subjecting corporations to individual limits 
would satisfy anticorruption concerns in the same way that the 
individual limitations do. The complete ban on corporate direct 
contributions is simply not necessary to achieve the narrow 
anticorruption interest that remains after Citizens United. 
Additionally, it is unclear whether the anticircumvention interest 
is adequate on its own where the anticorruption rationale is not 
sufficiently tailored. The anticircumvention interest has, alone, never  
served as a sufficiently important rationale for upholding the 
corporate ban.240 Even if it were sufficiently important on its own, the 
ban is still inadequately tailored. As one court recently recognized, 
other means of preventing the fraudulent circumvention of valid 
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limits exist in the form of laws that make it illegal for one person to 
make a contribution in the name of another person.241 The ban is 
therefore not the least restrictive means to satisfy any circumvention 
concerns, and it is therefore poorly tailored. 
By banishing the shareholder-protection and anticircumvention 
interests and limiting the anticorruption interest, Citizens United 
removes two legs of the three-legged stool upon which the 
contributions ban has rested. Moreover—and more important—by 
equating corporate speech rights with individual speech rights, 
Citizens United makes the tailoring of the ban far too loose. 
Beaumont theoretically remains good law, but the Court decided it at 
a time when the Court viewed corporate speech rights as derivative 
of the original rights that listeners and shareholders hold. Citizens 
United makes it clear that this framework is inappropriate under the 
First Amendment because the corporate right is original, not 
derivative, and because restrictions based on the corporate identity of 
the speaker are unconstitutional. To remain consistent with this 
framework, the Court should overrule Beaumont because within the 
framework a ban on corporate contributions is unconstitutional. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although Citizens United does not address the question of the 
constitutionality of the corporate direct contribution ban, it makes 
important and far-reaching changes to the doctrine that a future 
Supreme Court will use if the ban comes before it again. If that 
happens—and several cases are under way trying to ensure that it 
does242—to remain consistent with Citizens United, the Court should 
find the ban unconstitutional. 
Citizens United recognizes corporate original speech rights, and 
thereby ensures that corporations have a freedom to associate with a 
candidate via a campaign contribution in the same way that an 
individual does. Although the anticorruption and anticircumvention 
interests remain, the ban is poorly tailored to account for the 
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corporate original speech right that Citizens United recognizes. 
Under the Citizens United framework, the century-old corporate 
direct contributions ban is unconstitutional. 
President Obama’s controversial statements in his 2010 State of 
the Union address reflected a general apprehension over Citizens 
United among those who believe in the benefits of campaign finance 
reform.243 The concerns are probably motivated by the same concerns 
that motivated President Roosevelt and others to advocate for the ban 
in the early 1900s. But all need not be lost. Soon after Citizens 
United, the retailer Target gave $150,000 toward the election of a 
Minnesota gubernatorial candidate.244 Although Citizens United had 
nothing to do with that state-level donation, the increased public 
engagement on corporate campaign finance issues post-Citizens 
United made the donation a minor scandal.245 Target’s contribution 
provoked anger from shareholders and a threat of a boycott from 
consumers, and Target later apologized for the donation and changed 
its political donation policy.246 For those who are concerned about 
money in politics, the upshot of Citizens United may be that it will 
spark renewed vigilance among the voting public. 
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